Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing by Bennett, Charles H. & Brassard, Gilles
1'\ ··""·• 
1' 
. ... 
j
· 
-' 
I 
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY: PUBLIC KEY DISTRIBUTION AND COIN TOSSING 
Charles H. Bennett (IBM Research, Yorktown Heights NY 10598 USA) 
Gilles Brassard (dept. IRO, Univ. de Montreal, H)C 3J7 Canada) 
When elementary quantl.IIII systems, such as polarizea 
photons, are used to tran911it digital information, 
the uncertainty principle gives rise to novel cryp­
tographic phenaoena unachieveable with traditional 
tranS10ission noedia, e.g. a c0111111unications channel on 
which it is i11possible in principle to eavesdrop 
without a high probability of disturbing the trans­
•ission in such a way as to be detected. Such a 
quantum channel can be used in conjunction with or­
dinary insecure classical channels to distribute 
random key infor11ation between two users with the 
assurance that it reiuins unknown to anyone else, 
even when the users share no secret infonu.tion ini­
tially. we also present a protocol for coin-tossing 
by exchange of quantWII noes sages, which is secure 
against traditional kinds of cheating, even by an 
opponent· with unlinited computing power, but�ironi­
cally can be subverted by use of a still subtler 
quant1.1111 phenoaoemon, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen par­
adox. 
I. Introduction 
Conventional cryptosystems such as ENIGMA, 
DES, or even RSA, are based on a mixture of guess­
work and mathematics. Infonu.tion theory shows that 
traditional secret-key cryptosystems car.not be to­
tally secure unless the key, used once only, is at 
least as long as the cleartext. On the other hand, 
the theory of computational complexity is not yet 
well enough understood to prove the computational 
security of public-key cryptosystems. 
In this paper we use a radically diffP.rent 
foundation for cryptography, viz. the uncertainty 
principle of quantum physics. In conventional in­
for11ation theory and cryptography,· it is taken for 
granted that digital communications in principle can 
always be passively monitored or copied, even by 
someone ignorant of their noeaning. However, when 
information i� encoded in non-orthogonal quantum 
states, such as single photons with polarization 
directions 0, 45, 90, and 135 degrees, one obtains a 
conununications channel whose transmissions in prin­
ciple cannot be read or copied reliably by an eaves­
dropper ignorant of certain key information used in 
forming the transmission. The eavesdropper cannot 
even gain partial information about such a trans11is­
sion without altering it a random and uncontrollable 
way likely to be detected by the channel's legiti­
mate users. 
Quantum coding was first described in (W), 
along with two applications: ..aking 110ney that is in 
principle impossible to counterfeit, and multiplex­
ing two or three messages in such a way that reading 
one destroys the others. Hore recently JBBBW), 
quantum coding has been used in conjunction with 
public key cryptographic techniques to yield several 
sche...,s for unforgeable subw�y tokens. Here we show 
that quantum coding by itself achieves one of the 
main advantages of public key cryptography by per­
mitting secure distribution of random key informa­
tion between parties who share .no secret information 
initi_ally, provided the parties have access, besides 
the quantum channel, to an ordinary channel suscep­
tible to passive but not active eavesdropping. Even 
in the presence of active eavesdropping, the two 
parties can still distribute key securely if they 
share some secret information initially, provided 
the eavesdropping is not so active as to suppress 
connunications completely. We also present a proto­
col for coin tossing by exchange of quantum 11es­
sages. Except where otherwise noted the protocols 
are provably secure even against an opponent with 
superior technology and unli11ited COftputing power, 
barring fundamental violations of accepted physical 
laws. 
Offsetting these advantages is the practical 
disadvantage that quantum transmissions are neces­
sarily very weak and cannot be amplifi�d in transit. 
Moreover, quantum cryptography does not provide di­
gital signatures, or applications such as certified 
11ail or the ability to settle disputes before a 
judge. 
II. Essential Properties of Polarized Photons 
Polari%ed light can be produced by sending an
ordinary light beam through a polari%ing apparatus 
such as a Polaroid filter or calcite crystal; the 
beam's polarization axis is determined by the orien­
tation of the polarizing apparatus in which the beam 
originates. Generating single polarized photons is 
also possible, in principle by picking them out of a 
polari%ed beam, and in practice by a variation of. an 
experinient [I\GR) of Aspect, et. al. 
Although polarization is a continuous varia­
ble, the uncertainty principle forbids measurements 
on any single photon from revealing more than one 
bit about its polarization. For example, if a light 
beam with polarization axis a is sent into a filter 
oriented at angle P, the individual photons behave 
dichot01110usly and probabilistic�lly, being transmit­
ted with probability cos2 (a-P) and absorbed with the 
comple11entary probability sin7 («-P). The photons 
behave deterministically only when the two axes arc 
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parallel (certain transmission) or perpendicular 
(certain absorbtion). 
If the two axes are not perpendicular, so that 
some photons are transmitted, one might hope to 
learn additional infor111ation about a by measuring 
the transmitted photons again with a polarizer ori­
ented at some third angle; but this is to no avail, 
because the transmitted photons, in passing through 
the P polarizer, enoerge with exactly P polariza­
tion, having lost a,11 memory of their previous po­
larization a. 
Another way one might hope to learn more than 
one bit from a single photon would be not to measure 
it directly, but rather son,ehow amplify it into a 
clone of identically polarized photons, then perform 
measurements on these; but this hope is also vain, 
because such cloning can be shown to be inconsistent 
with the foundations of quant.um mechanics [WZ) . 
Formally, quantum mechanics represents the 
internal state of a quantum system (e.g. the polari­
zation df a photon) as a vector + of unit length 
in a linear space H over the field of complex num­
bers (Hilbert space). The inner product of two vec­
tors <♦It>, is defined as !j♦j•+j• where• indi­
cates complex conjugation. The dimensionality of 
the Hilbert space depends on the �ystem, being larg­
er (or even infinite) for more complicated systems. 
Each physical measurement H that might be performed 
on the system corresponds to� resolution .of its 
Hilbert space into orthogonal subspaces, one for 
each possible outcome of the measurement. The num­
ber of possible outcomes is thus limited to the 
dimensionality d of the Hilbert space, the most 
compiete measurements being those that resolve the 
Hilbert space into d 1-dimensional subspaces. 
Let Mk represeht the projection operator onto 
the k'th subspace of measurement H, so that the 
identity operator on H can be represented as a sum 
of projections: I• M1+H2 + ..•. When a system in 
state + is subjected to measurement H, its behavior 
is in general probabilistic: outcome k occurs with 
a probability equal to IHkt1
2, the square of the 
length of the state vector's projection into sub­
space H
k
. After the measurement, the system is left 
in a new state Hkt/lHktl, which is the nomalized 
unit vector in the direction of the old state 
vector's projection into subspace N
k
. The measure­
ment thus has a deterministic outcome, and leaves 
the state vector unmodified, only in the exceptional 
case that the initial state vector happens to lie 
entirely in one of the orthogonal subspaces charac-
terizing the measurement. 
The Hilbert space for a single polarized pho­
ton is 2-dimensional; thus the state of a photon may 
be completely described as a linear combination of, 
for example, the two unit vectors r1 • (1,0) and 
r
2 
= (0,1), representing respectively horizontal and 
vertical polarization. In particular, a photon po­
larized at angle a to the horizontal is described 
by the state vector (cosa, sina). When subjected 
to a n,easure�ent of vertical-vs.-horizontal polari­
zation, such a photon in effect chooses to become 
horizontal with probability cos2a and vertical with 
probability sin2a. The two orthogonal vectors r1 
and r thus a e;;:emplify the resolution of a 2-
dimen�ional Hilbert space into'2 orthogonal 1-
dimensional subspaces; henceforth r1 a� r2 will be 
said to comprise the 'rectilinear' basis for the 
Hilbert space. 
An alte�native basis for the same Hilbf>rt 
space is provided by the two 'diagonal' basis vec­
tors d1 • (0. 707 ,0.'707), representing a 45-degree 
photon, and d2 • (0.707,-0.707), representing a 
135-degree photon. TWo bases (e.g. rectilinear and 
diagonal) are said to be 'conjugate' (WI, if each 
�ector of one basis has equal-length projections 
onto all vectors of the other basis: this means that 
a system prepared in a specific state of one basis 
will behave entirely randonly, and lose all its 
stored infol'.lllation, when subjected to a 111easurement 
corresponding to the other basis. Owing to the com­
plex nature of its coefficients, the two-dimensional 
Hilbert space also admits a third basis conjugate to 
both the rectilinear and diagonal bases, comprising 
the two so-called 'circular' polarizations 
c1 • (0.707,0.707i) and c2 • (0.707i,0.70"1); but 
the rectilinear and diagonal bases are all that will 
be needed for the cryptographic �pplications in this 
paper. 
The Hilbert space for a compound system is 
construct�� by taking the tensor product of the Hil­
bert spaces of its components; thus the state of a 
pair of pht>t:t>ns is characterized by a-unit vector in 
the 4-dim�nsional Hjlbert space spanned by the or­
thogonal 6asis vectors r1r1, r1r2, r2r1, and r2r2. 
This formalism �ntails that the state of a compound 
system is not generally expressible as the cartesian 
product of the states of its parts: e.g. the 
·Einstei'n-Podolsky-Rosen state of two photons, 
0.7071(r1r2-r2r1), to be discussed later, is not 
equivalent to . any product of one-photon states. 
lll. Quantum Public Key Distribution 
In traditional public-key cryptography, trap­
door functions arc used to conceal the nteaning of 
messages between two users from a passive eavesdrop­
per, d�pite the lack of any initial shared secret 
information between the two users. In quantum pub­
lic key distribution, the quantum channel is not 
used directly to send meaningful messages, but is 
rather used to transmit a supply of randOffl bits be­
tween two users who share no secret information ini­
tially, in such a way that the users, by subsequent 
consultation over an ordinary non-quantum·channel 
subject to passive eavesdropping, can tell with high 
,probability whether the original quantum transmis­
sion has been disturbed in transit, as it would be 
by an eavesdrooper (it is the quantum channel's pe­
culiar virtue to compel eavesdrappinq to be active). 
If the transmission has not been disturbed, they 
agree to use these shared secret bits in the well­
known way as a one-time pad to conceal the meaning 
of subsequent meaningful convnunications, or for oth­
er cryptographic applications (e.g. authentication 
tags) requiring shared secret random information. 
If transmission has been disturbed, they discard it 
and try again, deferring any aeaningful-ca,nunica­
tions ur.til they have succeeded in transmitting 
enough random bits through the quantum channel to 
serve as a one-time pad. 
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In more detail one user ('Alice') chooses a 
random bit string and a random sequence of polariza­
tion bases (rectilinear or dia7onal). She then 
sends the other user (Bob) a trai_n of photons, each 
representing one bit of the string in the basis cho­
sen for that bit position, a horizontal or 45-degree 
photon standing for a binary zero and a vertical or 
135-degree photon standing for a binary 1, As Bob 
receives the photons �e decides., randomly for each 
photon and independently of Alice, whether to meas­
ure the photon's rectilinear polarization or its 
diagonal polarization, and interprets the result of 
the measurement as a binary zero or one. As ex­
plained in the previous section a random answer is 
produced and all information lost wh-en one attempts 
to measure the rectilinear polarization of a diago­
nal photon, or vice versa. Thus Bob obtains mean­
ingful data from only half the photons he detects-­
those for which he guessed the corre'ct polarization 
basis. Bob's information is further degraded I>¥ the 
fact that, realistically, some of the photons would 
be lost in transit or would fail to be counted by 
Bob's imperfectly-efficient detectors. 
Subsequent steps of the protocol take_place 
over an ordinary public communications channel, as­
sumed to be susceptible to eavesdropping but not to 
the injection or alteration of messages. Bob and 
Alice first determine, by public exchange of mes­
sages, which photons were successfully received and 
of these which were received with the correct basis. 
If the quantum transmission has been und•isturbed, 
Alice and Bob should agree on the bits encoded by 
these photons, even this data has never been dis­
cussed over the public channel. Each of these pho­
tons, in other words, presumably carries one bit of 
random information (e.g. whether a rectilinear pho­
ton was vertical or horizontal) known to Alice and 
Bob but to no one else. 
Because of the random mix of rectilinear and 
QUANTUM TRANSMISSION 
Alice's random bits. • • • • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • . • . • • . • . • • • • d 
Random sending bases. . . • • . . . • • • • • • . • • • . . . . • • • . . • • • 0 
Photons Alice sends .•..••.••••..•.••...••••...••.• .I' 
Random receiving bases .•.••.••.•...••....•...• , , • • R 
Bits as. received by Bob.. . . . . • • . • . • • • . . • . • • • . . . . • . 1 
PUBLIC DISCUSSION 
Bob reports bases of received bits •••....••....••. R 
Alice says which bases were correct •...•••...•.•.. 
Presumably shared information (if no eavesdrop) ..• 
Bob reveals some key bits at random ....••.•....... 
Alice confirms them ............................... 
OUTCOME 
Remaining shared secret bits •....•••.•.•........•. 
The need for the public (non-quantum) channel 
in this scheme to be immune to active eavesdropping 
can be relaxed if the Alice and Bob have agreed be­
forehand on a small secret key, which they use ·to 
create Wegman-Carter authentication tags [WCI for 
their messages over the public channel. In more 
detail the weqman-Carter multiple-message authenti­
cation scheme uses a small random key to produce a 
11essage-dependent 'tag' (rather like a check sum) 
for an arbitrary large message, in such a way that 
R 
t 
D 
diagonal photons in the quantum transmission, any 
eavesdropping carries the risk of altering the 
transmission in such a way as to produce disagree­
ment between Bob and Alice on some of the bits on 
which they think they should agree. Specifically, 
it can be shown that no measurement on a photon in 
transit, by an eavesdropper who is informed of the 
photon's•original basis only after he has performed 
his measurement, can yield more than 1/2 expected 
bits of information abo�t the key bit encoded by 
that photon; and that any such measurement yielding 
b bits of expected information (b s 1/2) must induce 
a disagreement with probability at least b/2 if 
the measured photon, or an attempted forgery of it, 
is later re-measured in its original basis. (This 
opti_mum tradeoff occurs, for example, when the ea­
vesdropper measures and retransmits all intercepted 
photons in the rectilinear basis, thereby learning 
the correct polarizations of half the photons and 
inducing disagreements in 1/4 of those that are lat­
er re-measured in the original basis.) 
Alice and Bob can therefore test for eaves­
dropping by publicly comparing some of the bits on 
which they think they should agree, though of course 
this sacrifices the secrecy of these bits. The bit 
positions used in this comparison should be a random 
subset (say one third) of the correctly received 
bits, so that eavesdropping on more than a few pho­
tons is unlikely to escape detection. If all the 
comparisons agree, Alice and Bob can conclude that 
the quantum transmission has been free of signifi­
cant eavesdropping; and those of the remaining bits 
that were sent and received with the same basis also 
agree, and can safely be used as a one time pad for 
subsequent secure communications over the public 
channel. When this one-time pad is used up, the 
protocol is repeated to send a new body of random 
information over the quantum channel. 
The following example illustrates the above proto­
col. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
D R R R R R D D R D D D R 
"I. +-+ i t +-+ - ..... .?' : ..... ,I" ,?' t 
D R R D D R D R D D D D R 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
D R D D R R D D D R 
OK OK OK OK OK OK 
1 1 0 0 1 
0 
OK OK 
0 
an eavesdropper ignorant of the key has only a small 
probability of being able to generate any other va­
lid message-tag pairs. The tag thus provides evi­
dence that the message is legitimate, and was not 
generated or altered by someone ignorant of the key. 
(Key bits are gradually used up in the Wegman-Carter 
scheme, and cannot be reused without compromising 
the system's provable security; however, in the 
present application, these key bits can be replaced 
by fresh random bits successfully transmitted 
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through the quantum channel.) The eavesdropper can 
still prevent communication by suppressing messages 
in the public channel, as of course he can by sup­
pressing or excessively perturbing the photons sent 
through the quantum channel. However, in either 
case, Alice and Bob will conclude with high proba­
bility that their secret communications are being 
suppressed,. and will not be fooled into thinking 
their communicaticns are secure when in fact they're 
not. 
IV. Quantura Coin Tossing 
'Coin Flipping by Telephone' was first dis­
cussed by Blum [Bl]. The problem is for two dis­
trustful parties, communicating at a distance with­
out the help of a third party, to come to agree on a 
winner and a loser in such a way that each party has 
exactly 50 per cent chance of winning. Any attempt 
by either party to bias th,, outcome should be de­
tected by the other party as cheating. Previous 
protocols for this problem are based on unproved 
assumptions in computational complexity theory, 
•·nich makes them vulnerable to a breakthro'-lgh in 
algorithm design. 
By contrast, we present here a scheme 1.nvolv-
1.ng classical a11d quantcim messages which is secure 
�gainst traditional k1.nds of cheating, e"vcn by. an 
opponerot with unlimited computing power. Ironical­
ly, it can be subverted t.y a still subtler quantwr. 
ph"!n@,tnon, the so-called !;;instein-Podolsky-Rosen 
Effect. This threat is merely theoretical, be1.:;ius,· 
it req'-lircs perf�ct effi�1.ency of storage and cietec­
tion of photons. •;hich though not imposs1.hle in 
irincipl.:, is ta.: ::ieyond the capahil1.ties of current 
A) ice's bit stri?"lq... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ , 
I-lice's random b.Ji .. is ............................. . 
rhotons Alice sends........... . ................. . 
Fob's random barc r.)································ 
Bob's rectiline?>: table ................ ........ .. 
f:,:C's diagonal la :-le ............................. . 
Bob's guess ..... ................................ . 
:,,.l ce 's reply. . . . . . . • . . . . . . • •.  • . . . . ... •...•..•.. 
,\lic.e sends her o :iginal bit �t.ring to certify .•.. 
Bob's rectiline,1 table ..•...............•........ 
,-i:::io's diagonal �a;,Jl,_, .....•.•..•.. , ...... � •.•.•... 
In order '"O s:heat, Bob woulr: nc,,d to guess 
Alice's basis •:-th i:robability greate: than 1/2. 
t 
R 
' 1 
1 
1 his am-:iunts tc c!istingushing a t:·ain of photon,; 
::c:.ndomly J:-:ilarizc-d in one basis from a tra1.r, randor.,­
ly polarized i� another basis. Ht.'wever, it can be 
shown that an:; rneasux-ing apparatus capable of making 
this distinction ccn also be used, i'> conj:.inction 
•�; � h the Einstein-Podols�y-Rosen effect descr ib<:d 
�, :-:,w to transmit usef1.<l informatio•, faster than 
tl1e sps,�j of light, in violation of well-establis. 1€d 
physical laws.
Alice could attempt cheating either at step 1 
o� step"· Let us first a�s=e that she follo,s 
s::ep 1 honestly and finds herself losing at the end 
;: step L, because Bob made he correct guess, here 
··:.. ... cliniear. In order tc pretend she has won, she 
0 
++ 
D 
0 
0 
0 
technology. The honestly-followed protocol, on the 
other hand, could be realized with current technolo­
gy. 
1. Alice chooses randomly one basis (say rectili-­
near) and a sequence of random bits (one thousand 
should be sufficient). She then encodes her bits as 
a sequence of photons in this same basis, using the
same coding scheme as before. She sends the result­
ing train of polarized photons to Bob. 
2. Bob chooses, independently and randomly for each 
photon, a sequence of reading bases. He reads the
photons accordingly, recording the results in two 
tables, one of rectilinearly received photons and 
one of diagonally received photons. Because of 
losses in his detectors and of the transmission 
channel, some of the photons may not be received at 
all, resulting in holes in his ta�les. At this 
time, Bob makes his guess as to which basis Alice 
used, and announces it to Alice. He wins if he
guessed correctly, loses otherwise. 
3. Alice repor.ts to Bob whether he won, by telling 
him which basis she had actually used. She certif­
ies this information by sending Bob, over a classi­
cal channel, her entire original bit sequence used 
in step 1. 
� Bob verifies that no cheating has occurred by 
comparing Alice's sequence �ith both his tables. 
There should be perfect agreement with the table 
corresponding to Alice's basis and no correlation 
with the other table. In our example, Bob can be 
confident that Al.ice's original basis was indeed 
rectilinc -.:: as claimed. 
Illustrating the protocol by a specific example, 
0 0 0 0 0 
Rectilinear 
0 
1 � .... � t t - t ++ t t .. ++ 
D D R R D R R D R R D D R 
0 0 
0 
1 Rectilinear' 
'You win' 
0 0 0 0 0 0' 
0 0 
0 
would need to convince Bob that her photons were 
:Hagonally polarized, which she can only do by prod­
ucing a sequence of bits in perfect agreement with 
Bob's diagonal table. This she cannot do reliably 
becaus" thicc table i!l the result of probab.i.listic 
behavior of the photons after the left her hands. 
Suppose she goes ahead anyway and sends Bob a new 
'original' sequence, different from the one that she 
used in step 1, in hopes that it will by luck agree 
perfectly with Bob's diaognal table. This atte11Pt 
to cheat requires Alice to be not only lucky but 
daring, because in the vast majority of cases, the 
gamble would fail and would be detected as cheating. 
By contrast, in traditional coin-tossing schemes, 
analogous attempts to seize a lucky victory frOft the 
jaws of defeat, though unlikely to succeeed, are 
unaccompanied by any danger of detection. 
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It is easy to see that things are even worse 
for Alice if she attempts to cheat in step 1, by 
sending a mixture of rectilinear and diagonal pho­
tons, or photons which are polarized neither rectil­
inearly or diagonally. In this case she will not be 
able to agree with either of Bob's tables in step 3, 
since both tables will record the results of proba­
bilistic behavior not under her control. 
In order to say how Alice c�n cheat using 
quantum mechanics it is necessary to describe the 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) effect [Bo,AGR), often 
called a paradox because it contradicts the common­
sense notion that for two individually random events 
happening at distance from one another to be corre­
lated, some physical influence must have propagated 
from the earlier event to the later, or else from 
some c0111111on random cause to both events. 
The EPR effect occurs when certain .types of 
atom or molecule decay with the emission of two pho­
tons, and consists of the fact that the two photons 
are always found to have opposite polarization, re­
gardless of the basis used to observe them, provided 
both are observed in the same basis. For example, 
if both Photons are 111Casured rectilinearly, it will 
always be found that one is horizontal and the other 
vertical, though which is horizontal will vary ran­
domly from one decay to the next. If both photons 
are measured diagonally, one will always be 135-
degree and the other 45-degree. A moment's reflec­
tion will show that this behavior cannot be ex­
_plained by assU111ing the decay produce� a distribu-
tion over a of oppositely polarized (a and a+90 1 
photons, since, in that case, if such a pair of pho­
tons were measured in an intermediate basis (say 
a+45), both would behave probabilistically so as to 
sometimes come out with the same polarization. 
Probably the simplest, but paradoxical­
sounding, verbal explanation of the EPR effect is to 
say that the �wo photons are produced in an initial 
state of undefined polarization; apd when one of 
them is measured, the measuring apparatus forces it 
to choose a ·polarization (choosing randomly and 
equiprobably between the two characteristic direc­
tions offered by the apparatus) while simultaneously 
forcing the other unmeasured photon, no matter how 
far away, to choose the opposite polarization. This 
iaplausible-sounding explanation is supported by 
formal quantum mechanics, which represents the state 
of a pair of photons as a vector in a 4-dimensional 
Hilbert space obtained by taking the tensor product 
of two 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The EPR state 
produced by the decay is descrioed by the vector 
0.7071(r1r2 - r2r1), and the EPR effect is explained 
by the fact that this vector has anticorrelated pro­
jections into the 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces of 
the two photons no matter what �asis is used to ex­
press the tensor product (e.g. the same state vector 
is demonstrably equal to 0.7071 (d1d2 - d2d1), and 
to 0.7071(c1c2 - c2c1)). 
In order to cheat, Alice produces a number of 
EPR photon-pairs instead of individual random pho­
tons in step 1. In each case she sends Bob one mem­
ber of the pair and stores the other !·c-rself, per­
haps bet,.een perfectly reflecting mi rr-=r·,. When Bo::-
makes his guess (e.�. n,ctilinear) she then measure■ 
all her stored pt.otcr!S 1, th,, opposite (diagonal) 
basis, thereby obtain..r.: ,:-esults perfectly correlat­
ed with his diac;c-nal tc1t 1-, b·1t uncorrelated with his 
rectilinear table. She t�·::r. announc�s these re­
sults, pretending th,,m tc, ·:e �he random bits she was 
supposed to have enccxkc _,. the r"hotons in step 1, 
and thereby for�es a win .'. ·;,m which Bob cannot es­
cape even by delaying his mr,,,•·urements until after 
his guess. This cheat requ.i. 1:.-s that Alice be able
to store the twin photons fc-r 3 considerable time 
and then measure them wit!, hcqh detection efficien­
cy, and thus woulrl be pos"j ::• · 0 only in principle, 
not in practice. Any pholons lost by Alice during 
storage or measurement would result in holes in her 
pretended bit sequence, which she would have to fill 
by guessing, and these guesse3 would risk detection 
by Bob if they failed to agr•?c, with his tables. 
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